Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Cannot Afford Low Prices And Low Interest Rates?

Markets tanked yesterday, and one of the reasons was the gauge of US consumer mood by Conference Board, that failed to inspire.

Bulls were sceptical - should we take the reading seriously? For example, Nomura commented:

The Conference Board's index of consumer confidence fell over 10 points in February after reaching a 15-month high in January. Though the consensus expected a small retreat , the magnitude of this drop was stunning and, at face value, would seem to signal an important set back for the nascent recovery. The decline, which cut the headline index to a 14-month low, reflected mainly a marked downgrading by consumers of their assessment of current conditions. That index fell to 19.4, an all-time low. Against a back-drop of rather impressive recent economic data, including a surprising dip in the jobless rate and low core inflation, this seems especially puzzling. The overall drop in confidence reflected deterioration in attitudes across all income groups, 7 of 9 regions and 2 of 3 age groups. As uniformly unsettling as the details of this report look, the contradiction of this evidence with other measures of consumer attitudes (e.g. the Michigan survey and recent Gallup poll readings) warrant skepticism. So too does the rather suspicious regularity of February weakness in this index. Since 2000, the index has declined in all but one (2007) February . Such a regularity across a varying backdrop of cyclical conditions business cycle time is unusual and raises questions (for which we have no ready answer) about the reliability of this particular seasonally adjusted measure.
On the other hand, BNP Paribas had the lust to dig for explanations. Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of BNP Paribas.

BNP Paribas focused on home buying conditions and plans to buy:

The University of Michigan index of buying conditions for homes, which is calculated as a percentage of people who believe that it is a good time to buy less a percentage of people who think it is a bad time to buy, bounced up in 2009 and remains above its long-term average (see above chart). However this measure has diverged sharply from plans to buy a home in the next six months in the Conference Board Survey, although ... the improvement in the Michigan survey has better captured the movements in home sales. The University of Michigan survey also asks the respondents why they think it is a good or a bad reason to buy a house. Low house prices have been the main driver of the improvement in housing demand, while the percentage of people citing prosperity or good investment as a reason for a purchase is virtually zero.
Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of BNP Paribas.

Low prices and low interest rates are not enough to afford a house? Where are we going?

I do not wonder that people cannot afford a house at these "low prices" and "low interest rates", especially, if one keeps in mind "Labour Underutilization Rate By Household Income".


Tuesday, February 23, 2010

F-Armaggedon's "Hard Rocks And Hard Shocks"

I had the chance to read the latest strategy journal by Don Coxe last night. Here are some interesting quotes:
Wall Street’s words of repentance and its acceptance of meaningful reform are as impressive and reliable as the investment quality of the average sub-prime CDO...

Despite that the technicals of US regional banks are improving on relative basis vs S&P500. Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Coxe Advisors, BMO Capital Markets.

This is addressed to Greeks:
Athenian democracy disappeared 23 centuries ago, and only returned when Truman intervened after World War II to prevent the USSR from taking over. Greece’s democratic performance since then suggests that the genes of Pericles and Solon are extinct.

Intimated with gold bugs, that are also gamed by the psychology of scarcity :
Aaron Regent, Barrick’s market-savvy new CEO, comes from a base metals background at Falconbridge. He helped fuel the flames of desire (after he had shrewdly convinced Barrick to pull in its huge hedges) by touching and stroking a hitherto-undiscovered erogenous zone in gold bugs: peak gold— which could be the latest Big Thing since peak oil.
This on responsible mining:
Therefore, responsible mining means mining some lower-grade ore during periods of high metal prices to expand mine lives. This not only serves the community, it protects the value of the company’s biggest asset—the mine. This was illustrated a while back when Freeport McMoRan announced a slight reduction in its copper and gold output, which meant earnings came in modestly below the estimates of some Street analysts. Some of these responded with criticisms of management’s “failure to execute,” and argued that shareholders should reconsider their approach to the stock.
Equity vs Stuff:
...investors should overweight the gold mines and underweight the bullion if they are bullish on the metal, and reverse the strategy if they turn bearish on the metal.
More of trading type conclusions available at The Pragmatic Capitalist, but so far I have not seen the full report available freely on web ...

Rajiv Sethi Offers "Some Readings On Liquidity, Leverage And Crisis"

A nice compilation of sources and a comment by Rajiv Sethi you will find here. For the straight entrance look below:

Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector by Holmstrom and Tirole
The Limits of Arbitrage by Shleifer and Vishny
Understanding Financial Crises by Allen and Gale
Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition by Broeker
Credit Cycles by Kiyotaki and Moore
The Leverage Cycle by Geanakoplos
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts by Farhi and Tirole
Liquidity and Leverage by Adrian and Shin
Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity by Brunnermeir and Pedersen
Outside and Inside Liquidity by Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman

Monday, February 22, 2010

Sacred Cows And Toxic Narcissists

I read at Dean Baker's "Beat The Press" today:
Actually, he has a pretty good case. With Goldman Sachs and the rest of the financial sector siphoning off an ever larger share of the country's output, we may not be able to afford much of anything in the future. If the financial sector's share grows at the same rate it has been growing over the last three decades, the rest of us will have to learn to get by on less.

This reminds me how Barry Ritholtz summed-up the Dean Baker's conclusions on "Big Bank Subsidy":
-The spread between big banks’ (1.15%) and smaller banks’ (1.93%) cost of funds is 0.78%:
-The annual boost to profits of 18 biggest banks from that funds -cost advantage: $33 billion;
-Pre-2008 spread in big and small banks’ funds -cost: 0.49%:
-Part of big banks’ profits from rate “subsidy” (1H09): 48%:

and then also this by Barry:
Here is something to think about: Even after the TARP has been fully paid back, the US Government is STILL bailing out TBTF banks more than we are giving bailouts to US families with hungry kids, and more than all of our overseas aid . . .
Of course, all those bank profits still have the "Mark to Make Believe" stigma ... and now when there is a doubt growing about the Eurozone recovery, the banks, especially in the Europe, may get into a difficult situation again. Bank analysts at Citigroup Global Markets estimated last Friday:

Funding Concerns — The volatility in bond markets has once again elevated the issue of funding for the banks. Sovereign and interest rate risks could add additional pressure to earnings. Recent 4Q results have already revealed NII pressures due to rising funding costs.

10% Earnings Hit — We estimate 10% cumulative impact to normalised earnings from four factors: higher credit risk spreads, higher interest rates, maturity extension, and net stable funding ratio requirements. This impact equates to c. 21 bps cumulative repricing of loan books. A sizeable chunk of the impact could be passed on to customers if changes in underlying rates & spreads are not abrupt.

€240 Billion Annual Issuance — We estimate that twenty-four European banks accounting for 65% of system assets may need to issue c. €240bn annually for the next three years. This issuance should be enough to fund the banks’ existing business and new business, as well as satisfy the new Basel stable funding requirements. At 76% of historical issuance for 2007-09, needs are not onerous.

Risk Appetite Flourished...and Wilted? — These twenty-four banks were able to issue €56bn of long/medium-term funding in January 2010. This is double the rate of January 2008 and 50% higher than in January 2009. However investors’ macro
concerns are restricting their appetite for new issuance in February and this could eventually drive up funding costs meaningfully. Fears of crowding out by sovereign and corporate issuers, however, look overblown.

Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Citigroup Global Markets.

Equity strategists at Danske Bank have an even less rosy look at European banks today:

The harsh future conditions for the Financials sector and specifically the banking industry are not discounted by the stock market.

This is a key problem for the stock market in 2010/11 as regulation, policy exit strategies and debt crisis make investments in banking stocks risky.

The high valuation of the industry makes it especially risky. Today investors pay a premium on European Banking stocks of 10% vs. a historical discount of 20%, and the market is discounting long-term EPS growth of 5% vs. historical 4%.

As Financials is still one of the two most market trendsetting sectors in the European stock market universe, the market, in our view, will remain vulnerable to the erosion of earnings conditions for the banking industry.

However, European banks are outperforming the market as I write ...


ECB Harmonized Competitiveness Indicator

In case one wants to know who has inflated oneself through the roof, economists at Societe Generale have drawn a nice chart, click to enlarge, courtesy of Societe Generale.
George Soros writes at FT today:
So makeshift assistance should be enough for Greece, but that leaves Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland. Together they constitute too large a portion of euroland to be helped in this way. The survival of Greece would still leave the future of the euro in question. Even if it handles the current crisis, what about the next one? It is clear what is needed: more intrusive monitoring and institutional arrangements for conditional assistance. A well-organised eurobond market would be desirable. The question is whether the political will for these steps can be generated.

Latvians inflated their wealth expectations into the sky, but the economists at CEPR still now write:
But even after two years of recession, with unemployment hitting 22 percent, the real effective exchange rate has only dropped 5.8 percent from its peak.
Interestingly, what it takes for Southern Europe to deflate?

Friday, February 19, 2010

Foreseeable Future Of Narcissists Ended Yester-night

Federal Reserve raised the discount rate yesterday night. Note that discount rate is charged to banks for direct loans by the Fed, and it is not the policy "Fed Funds" rate. WSJ Real Time Economics has a list of opinions on the move.

Interestingly, Bruce Kasman at JPMorgan opines:
This move is part of the removal of unconventional measures and should not be seen as a signal of a change in the Fed’s monetary policy stance.
That rather sounds like talking the "sweet spot" and "reflation trade"... However, Macro Man has it right, IMHO:
So while the Fed and much of the sell side are claiming that the discount rate hike "don't mean a thing", given current market pricing Macro Man ain't biting.
There is quite obvious risk of inflation scare in the markets (that would be wrong, IMHO), mainly due to base effects. Societe Generale, among the members of the hawkish wing commented:

The Fed is moving faster than anticipated and the pace suggests that we should anticipate outright rate hikes in the second half of 2010 rather than early 2011 as we previously expected.

The next likely step will be dropping the “extended” language from the FOMC statement. It is now a very likely outcome at the next Fed meeting on March 16. Whereas we thought that such an outcome was conditional on employment increases, the hurdle on that now looks much lower. Unless the employment situation deteriorates, the Fed is set to move forward with its accelerated exit plan.

Singaporean DBS got it even more hawkish:

Markets currently have one 25bps hike priced in Q3 and another Q4. DBS has been modestly more aggressive in its view than markets for some time. We continue to look for two hikes in Q3 and another two in Q4, putting Fed funds at between 1% and 1.25% by end-10. (The fed funds target midpoint is currently 0.125%). We view yesterday’s discount rate hike as confirmation that we are on the right track.
Global equity strategy team at BofA Merrill Lynch have it really sweet in their backyard:
Rising rates are a bull market phenomenon. Confirmation of this view requires a positive reaction from bank stocks and the yield curve staying steep.

MSCI ACWI target remains 350. Three quiet positives which boost our bullish cyclical view for global equities: US consumer data improving; there has been no deflationary shock for equities from Greece (inflation expectations are surprisingly elevated); bank performance yet to respond to steep yield curve ...

The next secular bull market in equities will coincide with a secular bear market in government bonds ...
As to me, the foreseeable future of narcissists ended yester-night, with global liquidity getting tighter and uncertainty increasing ...

Thursday, February 18, 2010

Market Impact Of Adjusting Inflation Targeting

IMF staff came out with a note last week "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy" that has sparked the "inflating out of debt" talk again. The Keynesian school a la Krugman is trying to support the idea with a reasoning by "academic economics", that often ignores the basics of markets. On the other side of reaction spectrum the "Austrian Mish" strikes back hard, but hyperventilated Zero Hedge digs deeper.

I am listing here couple of posts more or less related to the issue above and that I was quick to find, in random order:

Why hasn't the Fed been targeting two or three percent inflation?
Conducting Monetary Policy when Interest Rates Are Near Zero: Will it Work?
Googling "Inflation targeting" and "fiscal stimulus"
“Why Bernanke’s Defense of Super Low Interest Rates Does Not Hold Up”
Chris Sims on Policy at the Zero Lower Bound

The FX strategists at BNP Paribas had a note yesterday, with their views on the market impact:

It seems that long-term trends are in the process of terminating. When in the early 80s New-Zealand adopted inflation targeting policy the economy increased its inflation neutral growth potential which allowed for a higher valuation of assets. New-Zealand became the role model for other economies and when Norway experienced its NOK crisis in 1998 it was the last G-10 economy de facto converting towards an inflation targeting policy (the ECB targets inflation and money supply and the FED targets inflation and the labour market). Inflation targeting policy has been successful with inflation not only declining in absolute levels as well as in volatility. Reduced inflation rates encourage economic agents to forecast falling interest rate volatility given that its main component would have a smaller size. As a result, investors were able to reduce cash provisions and increase leverage. Monetary velocity moved up. This process was additionally supported by Western demographics where baby boomers invested trying to create assets to draw on when retiring. This environment allowed inflation to decline, leverage and monetary velocity accelerate as risk taking could increase and securitisation grew, further pumping up capital market valuation. This was the past, but the future will look very different.

Baby boomers are set to retire and thus will reduce the pace of capital accumulation which will not bode too well for risky assets. However, the biggest challenge for capital and implicitly for currency markets will come from the inflation front. The IMF’s chief economist Olivier Blanchard claims that the 2% inflation target adopted by most G-10 central banks should be revised to a higher level with 4% probably optimal. An inflation target of 4% will allow nominal rates to rise to 6-7% providing monetary authorities sufficient ammunition for easing policies when ever required. Higher inflation rates have as well the advantage channelling wealth from asset to liability holders, from the old to the young generation and within Europe from the rich south towards the poorer south. Additional effects suggest that agents will have to assume a higher volatility of rates and yields forcing them to reduce leverage and to hold higher levels of equity relative to assets. In the long-term a conversation toward a higher inflation target will reduce monetary velocity.

But what will be the market implications. First, central banks will have to remain accommodative in order for inflation to reach a higher inflation level. This additional liquidity will seek an asset class leaving the question, which one? Since higher inflation will be the outcome of this policy we suggest that equity markets will not benefit from central bank liquidity. When inflation rises, expected earnings will be discounted with a higher (inflation) rate suggesting equity markets would not benefit. PE ratios will generally decline. Higher inflation would be hostile for any sort of fixed income related products unless it is High Yield. The flow of funds will move there were revenues can be adjusted according to inflation. Soft commodities fall into this category. We have been arguing for some time that rising income in population rich areas such like Asia and Latam will promote soft commodity prices. G-10 potentially converting to a higher inflation target will additionally promote soft commodities as an asset class. Currencies of Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and the US will benefit from this potential long-term trend.


Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of BNP Paribas.


Well, there seem to be a lot of questions for me. First, was not the high asset prices and high debt levels compared to incomes that caused the crisis? Simply reflating to get higher asset prices do not solve the problem of incomes. US is loosing jobs because there are cheaper employees elsewhere. Secondly, food and energy inflation will squeeze out the discretionary spending in the lower income deciles anyway, so reducing the real quality of life, without making a change in the structure of incomes and consumption the effect will be short-lived? Increasing volatility will force to reduce leverage anyway. Among others also, why anyone believes that there are agents who can control that process? Rather, sovereign credit will be crucified in the name of corporate profits without any consequences?
Trying to fight secular forces?

Behavioral Economics By Thaler, Mullainathan, Kahneman

This comes via Farnam Street, H/T FT Alphaville:

...There's new technology emerging from behavioral economics and we are just starting to make use of that. I thought the input of psychology into economics was finished but clearly it's not! (Kahneman)


Class 1 LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM: WHY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO NUDGE (Thaler)
Class 2 IMPROVING CHOICES WITH MACHINE READABLE DISCLOSURE (Thaler & Mullainathan)
Class 3 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCARCITY (Mullainathan)
Class 4 TWO BIG THINGS HAPPENING IN PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Kahneman)
Class 5 THE IRONY OF POVERTY (Mullainathan)

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Reading James Montier ... Just A Bad Dream?

As always, worth spending some time reading the latest by James Montier - "Was It All Just A Bad Dream? Or, Ten Lessons Not Learnt", available at Zero Hedge and The Pragmatic Capitalist ...

European Bankruptcies To Come?

The economists at Societe Generale are looking at the yesterday's ECB survey of SME's (small and medium enterprises) access to bank financing. It appears that it is still tough to be small:

In terms of lending needs, while half of SMEs reported an unchanged need for bank loans in H2, a quarter of them reported an increased need. At the same time, about a third of SMEs complained that the level of interest rates on loans had increased despite the fact that policy rates have been constant. Underscoring the continued weakness of demand in the euro area, the most pressing problem faced by SMEs was still finding customers (28% compared to 27% in H1). However 19% of firms reported that access to finance was their most pressing problem, up from 17% in H1. SMEs reported that external financing was required to fund both fixed investment and inventories and working capital.

Banks, of course, see things differently. They claim lending is contracting in the euro area not just because they are pricing risk more appropriately but also because demand from companies, reluctant to invest, has fallen; this latest survey would appear to refute the banks’ claims. It is not hard to envisage a whole raft of SMEs that were viable businesses in the past but who are now screaming out for bridging loans to help see them through the recession. A number of SMEs are fearful of what will happen in the coming months as end of year results are presented to existing creditors. Having survived so far on existing covenants, there is a real risk that loans will not be rolled over, forcing increasing numbers of smaller and medium sized companies into bankruptcy. Clearly, there is a risk that this could yet provoke a second leg to the current downturn.


Click on charts to enlarge, courtesy of Societe Generale.

I will not wonder if at the end of the day some will conclude that the recovery so far has been overestimated. Just because statistics overestimate the performance in the SMEs, especially in the services?