Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Merrill's Global Fund Manager Survey

The heads were quite hot last month, but now we have got a bit of fresh shower. Though, Greek bail-out complacency prevails:

China & Greece chill January's excess optimism

The February FMS reverses the excess optimism on January. All growth and risk indicators moved lower: global growth diffusion index (DI) dropped from +72% to +51% and investors raised cash balances from 3.4% to 4.0%. February sentiment is cautious enough to steady markets but is not yet pessimistic enough for an unambiguous contrarian buy signal. Note two-thirds of our panel believe Greek default is unlikely, with 58% seeing a last minute bail out as most likely.

Three sentiment extremes to watch

First, the "double-dip" plunge in Chinese growth expectations (growth expectations cratered from +51% to +7%, lowest since March '09). Second, the collapse in European bank overweight from -16% to -53%. Third, investor optimism on the US dollar (a net 57%) is at a 10-year high. Reversals in Chinese equities, European banks and/or the dollar would signal ‘correction over’.

Consensus more bullish on rates

In reaction to the perceived growth shock, 42% of panellists now expect the Fed to be on hold until 2011 (vs. just 17% last November), and 45% expect the ECB to do nothing until 2011 (up from 17% in December).

Asset allocators cut equities, raise cash and bonds

In February, a net 33% of asset allocators were overweight equities, down sharply from +52% last month. Cash was raised with allocators now 12% overweight cash vs. 8% underweight last month. The proportion underweight bonds fell to -39%, from -48%, back to December levels. With a nod to changing China sentiment commodity overweights halved to +10% from +23% in January. Gold is viewed as overvalued (net 15%) but oil is now seen as undervalued (18% vs. 1% in Jan.).

The pain trades

Contrarian investors should be positioned for the following: US dollar depreciation, yen or Euro appreciation, global bank outperformance, tech sector underperformance, UK equity outperformance, lower bond yields. Elsewhere sentiment on EM looks more balanced, exposure to US equities is notably lagging US dollar optimism, telecoms and utilities are the better laggard defensives.


Growth expectations already peaked? Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Watch the China equities, European banks and the dollar!

Monday, February 15, 2010

Taiwanese Bull Rodeo?

I was curious about the "bull" in Taiwanese equities. However, a look at 30 year history of Taiwan Weighted equity index does not make that bull visible?

Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Nordea Analytics.


The run-up into 1990 and the subsequent collapse has left the bull without direction, but a wide range trading for the last 20 years...

Reading "The Invincible Market Hypothesis"

Rajiv Sethi, the professor at Columbia University & Santa Fe Institute, had a post yesterday that is worth reading in full. Here are some highlights for the lazy soul:

This passage illustrates very clearly the limited value of informational efficiency when allocative efficiency fails to hold. Prices may indeed contain "all relevant information" but this includes not just beliefs about earnings and discount rates, but also beliefs about "sentiment and emotion." These latter beliefs can change capriciously, and are notoriously difficult to track and predict. Prices therefore send messages that can be terribly garbled, and resource allocation decisions based on these prices can give rise to enormous (and avoidable) waste. Provided that major departures of prices from intrinsic values can be reliably identified, a case could be made for government intervention in affecting either the prices themselves, or at least the responses to the signals that they are sending.

Under these conditions it makes little sense to say that markets are efficient, even if they are essentially unpredictable in the short run. Lorenzo at Thinking Out Aloud suggests a different name:

...like other things in economics, such as rational expectations, EMH needs a better name. It is really something like the "all-information-is-incorporated hypothesis" just as rational expectations is really consistent expectations. If they had more descriptive names, people would not misconstrue them so easily and there would be less argument about them.

But a name that emphasizes informational efficiency is also misleading, because it does not adequately capture the range of non-fundamental information on market psychology that prices reflect. My own preference (following Jason Zweig) would be to simply call it the invincible markets hypothesis.

Well, for the lovers of complexity theory and computer science here comes the cake!

Global Asset Class Competition

With the focus on 4 main asset classes. This chart is almost one week old, but still valid. Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Jan Bylov of Nordea Markets.

Although the uptrend in commodities appear to be broken, Societe Generale is trying to push the maximum overweight trade in commodities today, and prefers precious metals/energy vs base metals/softs ...

Friday, February 12, 2010

Sentiment Vs Reality?

Disappointment of the week in the house of BNP Paribas. Click to enlarge, courtesy of BNP Paribas.

While the "mean reversion" fans in the US may be playing with the fire, cyclical hyper-ventilators are whispering:
"While the U.S. economic expansion is well set to strengthen in the near term, the current easing in WLI growth to a 25-week low suggests that growth will begin to throttle back by mid-year," said ECRI Managing Director Lakshman Achuthan.

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Reading On Latvia's Recession And Cost Of Adjustment With An "Internal Devaluation"

Mark Weisbrot and Rebecca Ray from CEPR with their view "Latvia’s Recession: The Cost of Adjustment With An “Internal Devaluation”".

Overconfidence In The Future Self-Control Leads To Large Bond Market "Event"?

I am not a fan of research from GaveKal, but I happen to discuss their ideas with my friends. However, the guys had a statement yesterday, I tend to agree:
The end of Lehman marked the death of securitization as we knew it, and the markets took a good six months to adjust to this new reality. But today, the Greek events mark the death of another pillar of the bull market: the idea that country risk can be safely discarded, at least in developed markets. And this could prove to be just as momentous an event.

Dylan Grice, the strategist at Societe Generale, goes further today with a basic math to explain the possibility of "to be just as momentous an event":

... maintaining a stable debt to GDP ratio requires governments to run a primary balance proportionate to the difference between interest rates and GDP growth.

Before seeing how our governments compare, two qualifications are necessary. Firstly, the European estimates are distorted by the recent "convergence" within the eurozone which allowed periphery economies temporarily higher GDP growth rates and lower interest rates. This makes on-balance sheet debt loads appear more stable for those economies than they actually are. Secondly, the calculations
show only those surpluses required to stabilise the debt loads which are on-balance sheet. And it's important to be clear about this. According to Gokhale [“Measuring the unfunded obligations of European Countries” by Jagadeesh Gokhale; National Center for Policy Analysis Policy Report 319; Jan 2009], most government indebtedness is in the form of unfunded pension and health liabilities, which are unrecorded and effectively off-balance sheet ...


Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Societe Generale.

Those on the left have been running budget balances consistent with falling on-balance sheet debt to GDP ratios, while those on the right haven’t. The US, the UK, Greece, Portugal and Norway (?) all fall into this latter category.

Eyeballing this chart, one might think governments ‘only’ need a 3% underlying contraction of fiscal policy in order to right the ship. Wouldn’t doing that over a number of years be plausible? Perhaps, but I can’t find any examples of it having happened before. And while that doesn’t make it impossible it does illustrate both the political difficulty of following such a path, and the behavioural biases present in politicians’ confidence that they will - if it is difficult to summon the political courage today, why will it be easier tomorrow?


But consider this: all countries, and especially those to the right in the chart, are enjoying exceptionally favourable financing positions, with government bond yields near unprecedented lows. Should anything push bond yields higher, even by just a percentage point, the on-balance sheet debt situation will become explosive. This is the situation in Japan where the 8% contraction required to rein in its already explosive debt ratio is politically impossible. And again, remember that the estimated 8% required contraction assumes the Japanese government can continue to fund itself at a 1.4% JGB yield, which is clearly unrealistic.

If the on-balance sheet position today looks dicey for the rest of us, the off-balance
sheet numbers are far more worrying. The following chart shows Gokhale’s estimates of the perpetuity surpluses governments would have to run to meet the current outstanding obligations which are both on- and off-balance sheet. The chart speaks for itself. Such fiscal deflation is clearly a political impossibility.


Click on chart to enlarge, courtesy of Societe Generale.
And he finalizes with an elegant warning to Keynesians:
Apparently heroine addicts can become so drug dependent their bodies cannot withstand the shock of withdrawal, and failure to continue taking the drug triggers multiple organ failures. I just wonder how apt that analogy is to our governments’ debt dependency today. As long as governments think that taking these difficult decisions to end the addiction will be easier in the future than it is today, they will never take the decision ‘today.’ At the very least, there will have to be a sufficiently large bond market ‘event’ to force the issue.

Keynesians have much more issues to re-consider, including the ones related to structural shifts in the incomes and taxes ...

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Neuroeconomics Reading ...

HT Mebane Faber, the "Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics" by Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec.

French Bears Look At Japanese Government Bonds

Analysts at BNP Paribas have mastered nice charts today. One interesting thing in the context of "The Great Recession of 2008/2009" is that the yields for Japanese government bonds were not pushed down to record low levels ... like in, for example, US.

Click on charts to enlarge, courtesy of BNP Paribas.


While Japanese are brewing THE TRADE, as Japan fades into the future with a walking stick... Latvians may miss the chance of that luxury.

Tuesday, February 09, 2010

Why Getting Slowly Lite Also With Defensives In Risky Assets?

Well, some "defensives" may be not so defensive in these days. First of all, think about the companies that are "easier to tax". Secondly, there are some market issues of which the analysts at Barclays Capital had a nice summary in relation to European affairs last week:

Signs of stress across asset classes: Concern over budget deficits could affect not only European bond yields, but also the euro (trade-weighted euro -5% since late October 2009) and equities (Euro STOXX 50 -6% since 11 January 2010).

Reduce Banks, Telecoms, Utilities: We see the greatest spillover effect from higher potential funding costs into these three sectors given: 1) their historically high correlation between the sector credit spread and underlying sovereign credit spreads; and 2) their high absolute debt levels and thus need for regular bond refinancing.

Move to ‘safe haven’ sectors/indices: We believe the low-debt defensive sectors to switch into include Healthcare, Food & Beverages and Food Retail. On a regional basis, we would expect the national equity indices of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain to underperform other European bourses owing in large part to their heavy banks weightings.

Pick your risks very careful!