When the crisis broke in September of last year, policymakers moved quickly and forcefully to kick-start a surge in domestic investment growth. On top of its own big fiscal stimulus package, the central government (in a classic demonstration of how command-economy-style dynamics can sometimes work well) effectively gave localDo not worry, "but policymakers and investors alike should be cognizant of the risks".
governments and state-owned enterprises the green light to ramp up investment and gave the banking system the go-ahead to finance it. A credit-fuelled investment boom ensued.
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The reason for this relates to China’s challenging GDP arithmetic: an economy that has a very high share of investment in GDP – as a result of investment growth having outpaced GDP growth for a long time – is inherently vulnerable to a collapse in growth when the investment boom stops, as it eventually almost certainly will.
To illustrate, suppose an economy has an investment share of GDP of 50%, investment grows at 20% in a given year, consumption growth is assumed to contribute 5 percentage points to growth and net exports are assumed to detract 5pp: the overall growth rate is 10% per annum. Now suppose investment growth in the next year slows to zero and (unrealistically) the other components of GDP again net out to a zero contribution – the growth rate collapses to zero. If investment were to fall, say by 10% (all else equal), growth would turn negative, to around -5%, with the year-to-year swing in GDP growth being a hefty 15pp. In such a scenario, it is virtually inconceivable that consumption growth could accelerate sufficiently in the short run to offset the downturn in investment. For instance, if private consumption were 35% of GDP, its growth rate would have to accelerate by about 29pp to offset the impact on growth of flat-lining investment growth (43pp in the investment slump case).
Note that, after a prolonged investment boom, even if investment were to fall by 10-20%, let alone just flat-line, having increased for so long and having become such a large chunk of economic output, the absolute level of investment would still be quite high. But the challenging GDP arithmetic implies that even investment taking a well-earned breather in growth could result in a devastating impact on overall growth in such an economy.
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Our illustration, while stylised, is not that different from China’s situation. China’s investment share of GDP in 2008 was 43.5% and, according to our forecasts, is set to rise to 49.6% by 2011; the consumption share was 35.3%.
Monday, September 28, 2009
Nomura On China's Challenging GDP Maths
Nomura's economists in their "Global Weekly Economic Monitor" address the challenges of China's GDP arithmetic. Paul Sheard in the Global Letter writes:
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China has a very cheap manufacture cost, that's why regardless of the crisis, its economy is still growing.
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